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Abstract 
System safety professionals, both researchers and 
practitioners, who regularly read accident reports reap 
important benefits.  These benefits include an improved 
ability to separate myths from reality, including both myths 
about specific accidents and ones concerning accidents in 
general; an increased understanding of the consequences of 
unlikely events, which can help inform future designs; a 
greater recognition of the limits of mathematical models; and 
guidance on potentially relevant research directions that may 
contribute to safety improvements in future systems. 
1 Introduction 
Our experience suggests that few people except accident 
investigators and lawyers read complete accident reports 
regularly. This is a shame.  People from many different 
disciplines have much to gain by regularly reading accident 
reports, particularly reports produced by professional 
investigatory organizations. This is especially true of system 
safety professionals, whether they are practitioners or 
researchers. 
 
Professional investigatory organizations, such as the National 
Transportation Safety Board in the United States and the Air 
Accidents and Marine Accident Investigation Branches of the 
Department for Transport in the United Kingdom, investigate 
and report on accidents for one primary purpose: to improve 
safety.  System safety professionals share this purpose, and 
thus it seems appropriate that they should seek to learn from 
the results of accident investigations.  We believe that 
regularly reading accident reports is an excellent way to do 
this. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we discuss four benefits that 
our experience suggests system safety professionals are likely 
to obtain from reading accident reports.  We have conducted 
some initial empirical studies into the benefits of reading 
accident and incident reports.  For example, a questionnaire 
was issued to safety professionals in the United Kingdom and 
the United States in 1999.  The results confirmed that 
remarkably few engineers ever read complete accident and 
incident reports [1].    
 
We believe that we have identified some key benefits that 
might be obtained if more engineers, particularly system 
safety engineers, read accident reports.  We have not yet 
conducted any experiments or case studies to confirm or deny 
whether these benefits are real, so this paper should be 
considered to be simply setting forth hypotheses for the 
reader’s consideration.  Also, further work is required to 
determine why more people do not read accident reports 
regularly. Our hypothesis is that people do not often read 
complete accident reports because they do not believe the 
reports contain information that will be helpful to them, but 
additional studies are needed to determine the accuracy of this 
hypothesis. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section two explains how 
reading reports may improve one’s ability to separate truth 
from fiction, reality from myth, regarding accidents.  Section 
three explains the positive effect that regular reading may 
have on one’s understanding of the possible consequences of 
unlikely events.  Section four describes how reading accident 
reports may improve one’s understanding of the limits of 
mathematical models.  Section five suggests ways in which 
studying accident reports may positively influence research 
directions.  The paper concludes with section six, in which we 
draw on the previous sections to encourage the reader to 
cultivate the habit of regularly reading accident reports. 
2 Dispelling Myths 
Perhaps the most obvious benefit that should accrue to those 
who regularly read accident reports is an improved ability to 
separate myths from reality in regard to accidents. This ability 
allows one to learn the lessons that are really taught by an 
accident or group of accidents. 
 
Myths and misunderstandings may be divided into two main 
categories:  those about specific accidents, and those about 
accidents in general.  Examples from both of these categories 
are discussed below. 
2.1 Myths about Specific Accidents 
Several years of observing presentations given at various 
conferences and of reading summaries of accidents written in 
technical papers and popular articles have shown that 
people’s understanding of specific accidents is often 
incomplete or inaccurate.   One symptom of this general 
problem is the way that electronic mailing lists, such as 
safety-critical@cs.york.ac.uk, are filled with threads in which 
respondents trade partial and incomplete accounts of previous 
failures in order to support points that are only made in 
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passing within an official report or are not mentioned at all 
[2].  
 
To illustrate some of the sorts of misunderstandings that exist, 
we briefly discuss three specific accidents below. 
Cali, Colombia, 1995 
On December 20, 1995, American Airlines flight 965 crashed 
into mountainous terrain while attempting to land at Cali, 
Colombia.  Of the 155 passengers and 8 crew members 
aboard the Boeing 757 aircraft, only 4 survived the accident. 
The complex causal factors leading to this accident [3] have 
been oversimplified in several different ways, ranging from 
claiming it as an example of a software error to asserting that 
the accident report exemplifies the tendency of investigatory 
agencies to blame the pilot.  Only someone who has read the 
complete accident report is likely to avoid being misled by 
these oversimplifications.   
Mars Climate Orbiter, 1999 
Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) was launched by NASA on 
December 11, 1998. The last signal was received from it on 
September 23, 1999 following Mars orbit insertion. The 
spacecraft was presumed lost. The cause of the loss of this 
spacecraft is usually attributed simply to a “units problem” in 
the software.  While such an attribution is consistent with the 
root cause determination of the investigation, it ignores 
crucial factors that led to the units problem occurring, factors 
that are perhaps more important for system safety engineers 
to understand than the so-called root cause [4,5].  Someone 
who has not read the mishap report, and hears only about the 
use of incorrect units, is likely to dismiss this mishap as the 
result of simple incompetence.   
Sioux City, Iowa, 1989 
On July 19, 1989, United Airlines flight 232 crashed while 
trying to make an emergency landing at the Sioux Gateway 
Airport in Sioux City Iowa.  The emergency landing was 
necessary because of an in-flight engine failure, which so 
severely damaged the aircraft’s hydraulic systems that the 
control surfaces were unusable. Of the 296 (285 passengers 
and 11 crew) persons aboard the aircraft, 185 survived the 
crash, although one of the survivors died 31 days after the 
accident as a result of his injuries.   
 
A common misunderstanding about this accident does not 
involve its causes, but rather the details about the survivors. 
Because this accident has frequently been used to justify the 
need to change the rules concerning restraining of infants and 
small children in aircraft, many people think that the survival 
rate for unrestrained children was lower than that for other 
passengers.  Reading the accident report [6] reveals that this 
was not the case.  Of the four unrestrained children aboard the 
plane, three survived, yielding a survival rate of 75%.  For the 
remaining 284 people, the survival rate was only 62%.  (We 
are not suggesting that this difference in survival rate means 
that changing the restraint rules for small children is 
unnecessary.  The NTSB called for such a change in its 
recommendations stemming from the accident. We use this 
example simply to illustrate the ease with which one can draw 
incorrect conclusions unless one reads the full accident 
reports.) 
 
For each of these examples, and for the many more examples 
that could be cited, reading the entire official report provides 
a much more complete picture of what took place than does 
simply reading or listening to what others say about the 
accident.  Without such a complete picture, it can be easy to 
draw the wrong lessons from a specific accident.  System 
safety engineers who want to draw the right lessons need to 
read the full reports. 
 
2.2 Myths about Accidents in General 
 
Just as reading the full report about a particular accident 
should keep one from believing falsehoods about, or having 
an incomplete understanding of, that accident, so too should 
regularly reading many accident reports keep one from 
believing myths about accidents and accident investigations 
in general.  Three such myths are discussed in this section:  
simplicity of causal determinations, personal invulnerability, 
and a bias towards blaming individuals. 
Causal Simplicity 
One myth about accident investigations that appears to be 
believed by some people is that making causal determinations 
for most accidents is a fairly simple thing to do.  Anyone who 
reads even a few major accident reports should quickly see 
that this is false.  Even relatively simple accidents often 
involve complex events and interactions, which makes 
determining why the accidents happened anything but simple. 
 
As an example, consider a school bus accident that took place 
in Omaha, Nebraska, on October 13, 2001.  A 78-passenger 
bus carrying 31 people ran off the side of the road, flipped 
over a bridge, and fell 49 feet to land in a shallow creek.  Four 
people were killed as a result.   
 
On the surface, this may appear to be a simple accident, one 
in which determining the causes would be equally simple.  
However, the NTSB’s report [7] on the accident reveals that it 
occurred as a result of complex interactions involving a work 
zone lane shift, narrow lanes, the speed limit, another bus 
travelling in the opposite direction, lack of median separation, 
and un-repaired damage to the bridge railing.  These 
interactions were so complex that the Board was unable to 
reach a unanimous decision about the probable cause 
statement. 
Personal Invulnerability 
A second general myth that some engineers seem to believe 
concerning accidents is that accidents only happen to 
incompetent people, or to systems or equipment designed by 
incompetent people. This myth is an instantiation of what is 
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known as the fundamental attribution error, in which people 
tend to emphasize personal characteristics over situational 
circumstances as the reason why certain actions or decisions 
are made.  Because few engineers consider themselves to be 
incompetent, they are inclined to think that accidents will not 
happen to them or to the systems with which they are 
involved.  The general mentality seems to be this: accidents 
only happen when someone messes up, and I will not mess 
up, so no accidents will happen to me or the systems with 
which I work. 
 
Regular reading of accident reports should effectively shatter 
this myth.  Although some accidents happen as a result of 
incompetence, most do not.  Rather accidents often happen 
despite the best efforts of very competent people to prevent 
them from happening.  Recognizing this should provide 
strong motivation to system safety engineers to be extra 
careful in their work, being especially diligent to consider the 
types of accidents that might happen, and working to design 
systems in such a way as to prevent accidents from 
happening. 
Blaming an Individual 
A third general myth about accidents, and perhaps the most 
commonly believed one,  is the notion that accident 
investigators are inclined to blame human operators at the 
expense of conducting thorough examinations into 
organizational and other systemic factors.  Such a notion is 
perhaps not surprising, given the discussion in the previous 
section concerning attribution error.  The notion is manifested 
in statements such as, “75% [or some other high percentage] 
of accidents are blamed on human error,” which are repeated 
often at conferences and in the literature.   
 
We recently conducted several studies to examine whether 
this oft repeated statement is supported by the evidence. 
These studies were prompted by intuition gained through 
reading many, many accident reports, which suggested to us 
that the conventional wisdom might well be wrong.  Our 
results served to confirm our intuition. 
 
The initial studies examined aviation accident reports 
produced by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) in the United States [8] and by the Transportation 
Safety Board in Canada [9].  The follow-up study examined 
the major accident reports in all transportation modes 
published by the NTSB from 1996 – 2004 [10].  The results 
of these studies confirmed our intuition.  We discuss briefly, 
and in simplified form, the latter study below.  Readers 
interested in the full details should consult the reference. 
 
In the all-modes study, we analyzed the 114 major accident 
reports adopted by the NTSB during the selected time period, 
distributed across the various transportation modes as 
follows: aviation – 30;  rail – 28; highway – 21; marine – 16; 
pipelines – 11; and hazardous materials – 8.   Table 1 shows a 
composite view of part of the results from our analysis.    
 
 
 
General Category By 
Causes 
By 
Reports 
Individuals 31% 62% 
Organizations 50% 80% 
Equipment 16% 43% 
Other 3% 10% 
 
Table 1: Attribution of causes in all reports. 
 
The first column, General Category, lists the four general 
categories into which we eventually grouped the causal 
factors identified in the accident reports.  The Individual 
category includes all those causal factors in which the actions 
or inactions of an individual were cited.  The Organizations 
category includes those causal factors citing matters dealing 
with company or regulator actions, inactions, policies, or 
procedures.  Causal factors involving equipment design or 
failures are included in Equipment.  Finally, the Other 
category includes those causal factors that could not be placed 
in one of the other three categories, with weather-related 
factors being the most common of these. 
 
The second column, By Causes, shows the percentage 
(rounded) of the total number of identified causes falling into 
this category.  For example, of all the causes identified in the 
114 reports, one-half of them involved Organizations, while 
only 31% involved Individuals. The third column, By 
Reports, shows the rounded percentage of the total number of 
reports in which at least one causal factor from the category 
was cited.  Thus, 80% of the 114 reports cited at least one 
Organizational cause, and 63% of the reports cited at least 
one Individual cause. 
 
Additional results from the study included the following.  
Considered by total causes cited, individuals accounted for a 
smaller percentage of causes than organizations for all modes.   
Considered by reports, individuals were cited in a smaller 
percentage of reports than organizations for every mode 
except aviation.  And for aviation, the percentage of citations 
of individuals was only marginally larger than that of 
organizations.  Also, more than twice as many reports cited 
organizational issues without citing any individual human 
errors, as cited individual human errors without also citing 
any organizational issues.  These results demonstrate 
conclusively that as far as major accidents investigated by the 
National Transportation Safety Board in 1996-2004 are 
concerned, it is not true to claim that the investigations seek 
to blame individuals, at the expense of a thorough look into 
organizational factors.   As mentioned previously, it was as a 
result of intuition gained through reading of many accidents 
that we were motivated to conduct the studies to debunk the 
myth of individual blame. 
3 Understanding Consequences 
Another benefit that we believe may come from the regular 
reading of accident reports is that it may provide a more 
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realistic understanding of the potential consequences of 
‘improbable’ occurrences. We explain briefly what we mean 
by this below. 
 
Often engineers, managers, and researchers think of safety in 
terms of a risk matrix, similar to what is shown in Figure 1.  
Such a matrix combines the severity of potential 
consequences with the likelihood of these consequences 
occurring.  Boxes with the same colour are typically 
considered to contain hazards that are basically equivalent, 
requiring the same level of attention.  This attention may 
range from hazards that must be eliminated entirely (dark 
grey boxes), to those that should be eliminated if practicable 
or controlled otherwise (medium grey), to those that should 
be controlled if cost-effective (light grey), to those that can 
permitted to remain without control (white). 
 
Severity of Consequence  
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
Frequent     
Probable     
Occasional     
Remote     L
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
Improbable     
 
Figure 1: A Typical Risk Matrix 
 
Several decades of experience has suggested that the use of 
matrices such as this can be quite helpful in improving system 
safety.   That is not to say that people are not aware of 
possible problems in the use of these matrices; they are.  For 
example, a paper by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
notes the following: “There can be inconsistency in risk 
assessments because there are at least two dimensions of 
subjectivity involved in the use of the risk assessment matrix. 
Interpretations of exposure, severity and probability may be 
different based on experience. This can be reduced by group 
discussions and averaging the ratings of several individuals. 
Remember the goal is to ultimately identify all risks in order 
of importance in order to prioritize risk control efforts.” [11]  
 
We believe that system safety engineers who make a habit of 
reading accident reports are likely to have a clear 
understanding of the potential pitfalls with these matrices, and 
to view them in slightly different ways than engineers who do 
not.  The primary way in which we think this is true involves 
the approach to handling hazards with remote likelihood but 
potentially catastrophic and critical consequences, for 
example hazards that could lead to loss of life or of multiple 
lives.  Traditional application of the risk management 
principles embodied in a risk matrix would typically permit 
either of two main approaches to be taken to such hazards: 
eliminate them, or reduce the likelihood of their occurrence to 
improbable. Regular reading of accident reports may well 
lead an engineer confronted with choosing between these two 
approaches to choose the former, if at all possible. 
 
We believe this to be the case because many accidents 
suggest a tendency on the part of system designers and 
operators to underestimate the likelihood of very improbable,   
undesirable events.  The potential consequences are often 
recognized, but their likelihood is thought to be quite a bit 
lower than it turns out to be. Examples of such accidents 
include the following: 
 
• Space Shuttle Challenger:  the consequences of complete 
O-ring failure were understood, but the likelihood of this 
failure occurring was not well understood [12]. 
 
• Space Shuttle Columbia: the consequences of a breach in 
the thermal protection on the leading edge of a wing were 
understood, but the likelihood of foam shedding from the 
external tank causing such a breach was thought to be 
much smaller than it turned out to be [13]. 
 
• Collision between U.S. Navy Submarine USS 
Greeneville and Japanese Motor Vessel Ehime Maru: the 
consequences of the submarine surfacing at a high rate of 
speed underneath a surface vessel were known, but the 
likelihood that there was a nearby vessel was not 
understood [14]. 
 
• American Airlines flight 587: the consequences of 
exceeding the ultimate design loads on the vertical 
stabilizer were known, but the likelihood of a pilot 
causing the airplane to exceed these loads was 
underestimated by both pilot and the airframe 
manufacturer (although in different ways) [15]. 
 
• United Airlines flight 585 and USAir flight 427: the 
consequences of a rudder reversal at low altitude and 
speed were understood, but the likelihood of it happening 
was not [16,17]. 
 
System safety engineers who read these reports, and the many 
others that show the same thing, may decide that system 
safety would be better served if designers focused more of 
their efforts on eliminating or mitigating the consequences of 
severe system hazards, rather than on attempting to further 
reduce the likelihood of occurrence of these hazards.  This 
does not mean that engineers should not think about 
probabilities, only that perhaps the balance might be off.  This 
seems particularly true within the system safety research 
community, where the opportunity often exists to consider 
alternate designs, techniques, and architectures that might be 
able to eliminate entire categories of adverse consequences, 
rather than simply reducing the probability of these 
consequences happening. 
4 Recognizing Limits of Math Modelling 
Still another benefit to be gained by system safety engineers 
from a regular reading of accident reports is a greater 
recognition of the limits of mathematical models. 
Mathematical modelling is applicable across many areas, in 
many different ways. In some areas, its full potential is rarely 
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realized, particularly within the United States.  Analysis of 
software / hardware algorithm correctness via formal methods 
is one such area [18]. Also, various forms of mathematical 
modelling are often used in accident investigations: detailed 
simulations and performance analysis are two examples.  
However, mathematical modelling is not without its limits.  
Regular reading of accident reports can help to highlight two 
areas in which limits exist: understanding complex 
interactions, and causal description. 
4.1 For understanding complex interactions 
In the previous section we listed several accidents in which 
the likelihood of certain events occurring was not well 
understood.  Both of the space shuttle accidents also illustrate 
limits on the use of mathematical models to help understand 
complex interactions.  In both cases, there existed 
mathematical models used to simulate aspects of the systems 
which ultimately contributed to the accidents, and in both 
cases these models turned out to be inadequate. 
 
Another example of the limits of mathematical models comes 
from the report on the loss of the Mars Polar Lander [19]. 
Mars Polar Lander (MPL) was launched on January 3, 1999, 
and arrived at Mars eleven months later. MPL lost contact 
with mission control approximately ten minutes before its 
expected landing, and was presumed crashed into the Martian 
surface.  The mishap investigation board included the 
following observations concerning the use of mathematical 
modelling (analysis) in the MPL development: “... many of 
the findings are related to the propulsion system, which 
employed analysis as a substitute for test in the verification 
and validation of total system performance. Therefore, the 
end-to-end validation of the system through simulation and 
other analyses was potentially compromised in some areas 
when the tests employed to develop or validate the constituent 
models were not of an adequate fidelity level to ensure system 
robustness.” 
4.2 For causal description and analysis 
The use of mathematical modelling for causal analysis and 
description is also limited. Although formal definitions for 
'cause' exist, these definitions have significant limitations 
[20]. One limitation is that they are not easy for non-logicians 
to use effectively or correctly. This limitation alone might 
relatively minor; however, other limitations exist that are 
more serious.   
 
In particular, counterfactually-based definitions of cause, 
which are the primary type that have been proposed, are both 
too narrow and too broad. They are too narrow in that they 
tend to eliminate as causal factors many of the organizational 
factors that are typically, and correctly, identified as causal in 
accidents.  On the other hand, these formal definitions are too 
broad in that they often lead to difficulty in making necessary 
distinctions between causes and conditions, both of which 
may be shown to be counterfactually necessary. 
5 Setting Directions 
A final benefit of regular reading of accident reports is the 
prospect that doing so will help provide guidance on 
potentially relevant research directions. This possible 
guidance may lead in two directions: towards areas of likely 
safety improvements, and away from areas unlikely to affect 
safety.   
 
One of the main ways in which guidance towards areas of 
likely safety improvements may be obtained is by carefully 
reading and understanding the recommendations made in 
individual accident reports.  Many of the recommendations 
involve changes in procedures, training, or regulations, for 
which research is unnecessary; but some recommendations 
also involve matters for which research is needed.  Examples 
of research matters mentioned in recent NTSB 
recommendations include the following: crew alertness and 
fatigue [21], minimum frictional quality standards for 
commercial tires on wet pavement [22], effectiveness of 
colour vision test protocols at screening out pilot applicants 
with impairing colour vision deficiencies [23], techniques for 
determining actual aircraft weight and balance data [24], and 
methods for converting non-frangible structures to frangible 
ones [25]. 
 
Another way in which guidance towards areas of likely safety 
improvements may be obtained is by considering broad 
classes of accidents that appear across many reports.  For 
example, much research concerning fatigue, terrain warning, 
collision avoidance, and anti-lock brakes was motivated by 
trends noticed in accident reports.   Careful consideration of 
accident trends may also provide guidance away from areas 
of research that are unlikely to improve safety significantly. 
 
There are some caveats to kind in mind, however, when 
seeking guidance for research directions from accident 
reports.  One of the most important caveats is the need to 
watch for a tendency to ‘fight the last war’; that is, to conduct 
research that addresses issues that are no longer as important 
as they once were.  A rather old, but nevertheless illustrative, 
example of this comes from 1970 in NASA.  During a brief 
period shortly after his historic landing on the moon, Neil 
Armstrong served as the deputy associate administrator for 
aeronautics within the Agency.  When a proposal came to him 
for research into automated aircraft flight controls using 
analog computers, he rejected it, telling the proposal writers 
that digital flight controls were the way to go [26]. 
 
Another important caveat is the need to be mindful of biases 
that might affect ones judgement.  Two particularly 
dangerous biases are hindsight bias (which can lead you to 
think you have solved a problem when you do not even really 
understand it), and technology bias (which immediately 
assumes that accident causes can be solved by different 
technology, particularly the technology in which you have a 
vested interest). The effect of these two biases can often be 
readily seen in the aftermath of some recent accidents, where 
a multiple of different researchers produced papers and 
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presentations explaining how their particular techniques 
would have prevented the accident from happening.  The 
Ariane 5 flight 501 explosion [27] and the Mars Polar Lander 
loss are two such accidents for which this has happened.  
 
Technology bias also appears in a general form, when the 
assumption is made that every causal factor in an accident is 
likely to have a technological solution.  One of the most 
dangerous and ubiquitous forms of this type of technology 
bias today is the assumption that increasing automation is 
always a good thing, an assumption that appears to shared by 
quite a few people [28]. 
 
A final important caveat to remember is that research alone 
does not improve safety.  Insertion of the positive results of 
the research into practice is necessary for real improvements 
to happen. Theoretical results that are not used in system 
development and certification do not improve safety. 
 
Within the system safety community, perhaps more so than 
within any other community, a close, mutually respecting 
relationship is essential between system safety practitioners 
and researchers.  Without such a relationship, researchers are 
unlikely to produce anything useful in real systems, and 
practitioners are unlikely to make any improvements over the 
current state-of-the-practice. Perhaps a shared understanding 
of the results of previous accidents, based on careful and 
regular reading of accident reports, might help improve this 
relationship.  
6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has proposed four benefits that are likely to accrue 
to system safety professionals from the regular reading of 
accident reports: an improved ability to separate myths from 
reality; an increased understanding of the consequences of 
unlikely events; a greater recognition of the limits of 
mathematical models; and guidance on potentially relevant 
research directions.   Our basis for asserting the existence of 
these benefits is personal experience and observation.  We 
encourage readers of this paper to conduct your own case 
studies to see if you obtain the benefits we believe you will. 
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